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Abstract 
This paper introduces an agent-based model of a passenger railway line. The model is used for comparing 
the welfare of the railway market under unregulated duopoly and monopoly with maximum-price 
regulation. In the model, the railway operators gradually adjust passenger fares and eliminate train 
departures until the market reaches steady state. The paper analyses the steady-state data generated 
using two sets of parameter values. It finds that for most maximum-price levels, including the price that 
would be chosen by an unregulated monopoly, the total welfare in the monopolistic market is significantly 
lower compared to the duopoly market. However, there are some levels of maximum price which produce 
similar or even higher welfare than the duopoly market. The paper suggests that if correctly implemented, 
a simple maximum-price regulation may generate welfare outcomes comparable to competition. 
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1. Introduction 
The main component of the European railway reform is the separation of infrastructure and 
transport services, which opens the possibility of competition in the market. Two common 
competitive regimes are open access and franchising. Under open access, more train companies 
may operate in the market. While open access is an option in the markets which are not under 
public obligation (approximately 10% of European markets), it is used significantly less 
frequently. Under franchising, the market with specified terms of service is usually auctioned to 
a single operator. Franchising is used particularly for subsidized markets, but it can be 
implemented also in profitable routes. [4] 
The goal of the paper is to discuss the welfare effects of monopoly with specified 
maximum permitted fare (franchising) as compared to an unregulated duopoly (open access). 
For this purpose, the paper introduces an agent-based model of a railway line. The construction 
of the model is similar to the model presented in [2] and [3]. The model contains one or two 
operators each with more trains departing every day. In sequential steps, the firms adjust prices 
and departure times of their trains until they reach steady state. Finally, the steady-state 
outcomes are used for comparing the monopolistic and duopolistic market structures. 
Even though the agent technology is used in transport logistics, especially in scheduling, 
dispatching, optimization of train coupling and sharing systems, or allocation of railroad tracks 
(see [1] for a survey), the presented model uses a specific market-based approach which 
determines not only the optimal timetable, but also prices and welfare outcomes. Moreover, the 
paper addresses the topic of regulation of a monopolistic railway operator. There are several 
empirical studies dealing with the problem of franchising regulation (see [5] or [6]). But to our 
knowledge, there are no papers using agent-based simulation for comparing the welfare under 
competition and franchise contract with the maximum price regulation. 
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 introduces the agent-based model of 
a passenger railway line. Section 3 presents the data generated by the model and the empirical 
methodology. Section 4 shows the results of the analysis. And Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Model 
This section presents an agent-based model of a passenger railway line. The model is 
implemented in the modeling environment Netlogo 5.0.1. In the model, agents behave according 
to specific rules in a given order. In this section, I describe the model in the same order used in 
the simulations. In each simulation, the model is first initialized and then runs for T periods.  
In the initialization phase, the model creates the landscape, passengers and sets initial 
train departure times. The landscape is a horizontal line of 240 patches (in Netlogo, a patch is a 
square field whose side can be used as a measure of distance). The line represents 24 hours at 
a railway station in the departure city. As the total length of the line is 240 patches, a patch 
represents 6 minutes. 
In the landscape, the model locates 1,000 passengers which may differ in two respects. 
First, in their reservation price pr which is the maximum price they are willing to pay for a train 
ticket to the destination city. The reservation price of a passenger is drawn from a uniform 
distribution between the minimum and maximum reservation price. Second, they differ in their 
location on the horizontal line. The location represents the time at which passengers arrive at 
the station in the departure city, or alternatively the arrival time that would suit them best. For 
instance, a passenger located at 125 arrives, or would like to arrive at the station at 12.30 p.m. In 
order to approximate a realistic time pattern, I draw the location of a half of passengers from 
normal distribution with the mean of 70 and standard deviation of 30 (morning rush hours) and 
of another half of passengers with the mean of 160 and standard deviation of 30 (evening rush 
hours). If the drawn location is higher than 240 or lower than 0, the passenger is placed 
randomly between 0 and 240.  
Suppose that there are either one or two train operators in the market. During the 
initialization, the model creates as many train departures as possible, sets the initial fare to 0, 
and determines the departure times. Let us assume the smallest technologically feasible 
difference between the departure times of trains is 10 minutes (for instance because all the 
trains on the connection depart from the same platform). Hence, the model creates 144 trains 
departing every 10 minutes from 0.00 to 23.50 if there is only one operator. In a duopoly, 
operator A has 72 trains leaving every 20 minutes from 0.00 to 23.40 and operator B 72 trains 
departing every 20 minutes from 0.10 to 23.50. 
After the initialization phase, the model evolves in periods. Each period has three or four 
phases: 1) passengers choose their departure times, 2) the operators calculate profits or losses 
of the individual trains, 3) in certain periods, the operators may eliminate one train, and 4) the 
operators adjust prices. 
1) Choice of a train – The variables relevant for the optimal choice of passenger j are her 
reservation price prj, the price of train i at time t pit, the waiting time in hours hijt and the per 
hour weighting cost w > 0. Passenger j chooses the train with the lowest pit + whijt if prj > pit + whijt 
and no train otherwise. The choice of no train means that the passenger uses a different mode of 
transport (bus, airplane, car), or that she does not travel at all. Therefore her reservation price is 
likely to depend on the availability of alternative transport modes and her preference for train 
transport. 
2) Profit calculation – The profit of train i in period t equals to πit = pitqit – F, where qit is the 
number of passengers on the train and F are fixed and quasi-fixed costs.  
3) Exit – In certain periods, called exit periods, each operator considers eliminating the 
train with the lowest profit. If the profit of the operator without the train is higher than with the 
train given the prices of all other trains, the train is eliminated. Otherwise, the train remains in 
operation. If the exit of the least profitable train does not increase the operator’s profit, it closes 
the second least profitable train in the next exit period. This continues until the operator 
considers closing each of less profitable half of all its trains. Then again, it starts from the least 
profitable train. 
4) Adjusting prices – The prices of each train may increase or decrease by ε > 0, or remain 
constant. There are two possible pricing strategies: uniform and local pricing. In this paper, I 
assume that firms use uniform pricing, which means that all trains of one operator charge the 
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same price. Hence in period t, each operator chooses the price pit + ε, pit – ε or pit that maximizes 
its profit (given the price of the other operator if there are two operators in the market). 
Each simulation lasts for T periods and has two phases: For the first TA periods, firms 
adjust prices given no trains exit the market. Then for the remaining TC periods, firms consider 
eliminating trains and at the same time adjust prices. The exit period is every cth period in the 
second phase. If there is only one train operator, it considers eliminating a train every cth period. 
If there are two operators, operators may eliminate one train every cth period in turns. That is, 
each operator can change its timetable every 2cth period. The second phase has to be long 
enough so that the actual prices and the timetable are relatively stable in the last TE periods. 
However, the variables may vary slightly even in these periods, or some variables may evolve in 
cycles. Therefore, the model reports averages of the key variables over the last TE periods. 
3. Data and methodology 
In this section, I describe the data generated by the model and discuss the empirical 
strategy used for analyzing the data. The data is generated using the function Behavior space in 
Netlogo 5.0.1. I consider data generated in two scenarios with the following common parameter 
values: The fixed cost is F = 1000, the waiting cost w = 100, pricing step ε = 2, and the exit period 
occurs every c = 4 periods. The total number of periods in each run is T = 1,000. The price is 
adjusted for the first TA = 200 periods and the variables are measured for the last TE = 100 
periods. In scenario 1, the reservation price ranges from 100 to 200 and in scenario 2, the 
reservation price ranges from 100 to 400. 
In each scenario, I compare the setting with two firms to the setting with 1 firm using 
maximum prices pc = {10, 20, 30, …, pm}, where the price pm is higher than the price that would 
be chosen by an unregulated monopoly. For each setting, I run 10 random initializations of the 
model with random seeds 1 to 10 using random-seed function in Netlogo 5.0.1. 
Each simulation generates the following variables: 
• Quantity Q is the number of passengers who bought a ticket (called customers) averaged 
over the last TE = 100 periods. 
• Price P is the average price paid by customers averaged over the last TE = 100 periods. 
• Number of trains M is the total number of trains departing from the railway station 
averaged over the last TE = 100 periods. 
• The waiting cost C is the sum of the weighting costs of customers averaged over the last 
TE = 100 periods. 
• Total profit Π is the sum of the profits of individual trains πit averaged over the last TE = 
100 periods. 
• Consumers’ surplus CS is sum of individual surpluses of customers calculated as prj – pit – 
whijt averaged over the last TE = 100 periods. 
• Total welfare W is the sum of total profit Π and consumers’ surplus CS. 
Each monopoly parameterization is compared to a situation in which the price is found by 
the duopoly market in the following way. I run the following simple OLS regression: 
,_10 FIRMSNOX αα +=  (1) 
where X may be one of the variables presented in the previous paragraph and NO_FIRMS is 
a dummy variable that is equal to 0 if there are two firms in the market, and to 1 in the case of 
monopoly. In the following subsection, I report coefficients α1 and heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors (hc1 in R). These numbers show the direction and size of the effect and indicate 
whether the effect is statistically significant. 
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4. Results 
This section compares the welfare effects of a monopoly with price regulation and two-
firm competition using the data described in the previous section. The data is analyzed in the 
software environment R. The Table 1 compares the situation under regulated monopoly and 
duopoly in scenario 1 with the reservation price ranging from 100 to 200. The second row 
shows the means and standard errors of the total welfare W, number of firms M, number of 
customers Q, and the waiting cost C. The rest of the table presents the change in number of trains 
ΔM, number of customers ΔQ, total waiting costs ΔC, and total welfare ΔW due to the shift from 
duopoly to monopoly in scenario 1. The rows show different maximum prices pc. While the mean 
of the average price P under duopoly is 80, the price charged by an unregulated monopoly is 
approximately 99. Therefore the maximum price is always binding except for the situation with 
the maximum price pc = 100.  
In the first column, we can see that the total welfare is statistically significantly lower for 
all maximum prices except for pc = 60, 70, and 80. The change in total welfare can be 
decomposed in three parts. First, total welfare is higher due to the lower number of trains (i.e. 
due to the lower total fixed costs) under regulated monopoly – the change in the number of 
trains ΔM is significantly negative and increasing in the maximum price pc. Second, since the 
train departures are less frequent, the waiting costs are so high for some passengers that they 
stop using trains. Table 1 shows that the change in the number of customers ΔQ is significantly 
negative for all relevant prices. With increasing maximum price pc, ΔQ first increases thanks to 
the increasing number of trains, and then decreases because of the increasing train fares. Each 
lost customer reduces the total welfare in the market by her reservation price which ranges 
from 100 to 200. And finally, the lower number of departures increases the total waiting cost of 
the remaining customers. The change in waiting cost ΔC is significantly positive and decreasing 
in pc because of the increasing number of trains M. 
 
Table 1. The effect of monopoly with regulated price – scenario 1 
Duopoly mean W 
(s.e.) 
mean M 
(s.e.) 
mean Q 
(s.e.) 
mean C 
(s.e.) 
 95.337 
(2.378) 
35.8 
(2.25) 
950 
(23.5) 
13,054 
(1,034) 
Maximum 
price 
ΔW  
(s.e.) 
ΔM  
(s.e.) 
ΔQ  
(s.e.) 
ΔC  
(s.e.) 
pc = 10 -38,768 
(2,720)) 
-31.3 
(0.76) 
-274 
(30.1) 
33,004 
(588) 
pc = 20 -21,278 
(1,152) 
-28.9 
(0.73) 
-124 
(12.3) 
33,004 
(588) 
pc = 30 -9,703 
(1,210) 
-26.7 
(0.73) 
-61 
(9.4) 
27,935 
(742) 
pc = 40 -6,607 
(1,308) 
-25.6 
(0.74) 
-55 
(9.0) 
24,117 
(545) 
pc = 50 -2,931 
(922) 
-24.0 
(0.74) 
-55 
(9.0) 
20,040 
(534) 
pc = 60 -1,516 
(1,156) 
-22.7 
(0.81) 
-65 
(10.7) 
16,089 
(575) 
pc = 70 101 
(1,179) 
-20.3 
(0.91) 
-70 
(10.9) 
11,719 
(487) 
pc = 80 400 
(902) 
-17.8 
(0.88) 
-82 
(9.3) 
7,661 
(483) 
pc = 90 -2,237 
(932) 
-15.5 
(0.83) 
-116 
(8.9) 
4,182 
(395) 
pc = 100 -7,616 
(1,112) 
-14.5 
(0.81) 
-172 
(9.7) 
1,861 
(361) 
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Table 2 compares the market situations under duopoly and regulated monopoly in 
scenario 2 in which the reservation prices range from 100 to 400. Table 2 has the same structure 
as Table 1. The first row presents means and standard errors of total welfare W, number of 
trains M, total sales Q, and waiting costs C under duopoly. Compared to scenario 1, higher 
reservation prices lead to significantly higher total welfare, number of consumers, and waiting 
costs. The remaining rows show coefficients and standard errors of regression equation (1). In 
Table 2, I present only a part of the relevant range of prices. For the maximum prices pc = {10, 
20, 30, …, 170}, the changes in total welfare ΔW, the number of firms ΔM and customers ΔQ are 
significantly negative and increasing in the maximum price pc. The change in the waiting cost ΔC 
is significantly positive and decreasing in pc. The table presents more interesting price range 
from pc = 180 to 300. The signs and trends of the coefficients are similar to scenario 1. What is 
important, the change in total welfare is significantly negative or not statistically significant for 
all maximum prices pc with one exception. The change in total welfare is significantly positive for 
the maximum price pc = 260. 
 
Table 2. The effect of monopoly with regulated price – scenario 2 
Duopoly mean W 
(s.e.) 
mean M 
(s.e.) 
mean Q 
(s.e.) 
mean C 
(s.e.) 
 297,550 
(2,982) 
33.7 
(0.08) 
996 
(4.7) 
17,870 
(1,550) 
Maximum 
price 
ΔW 
(s.e.) 
ΔM 
(s.e.) 
ΔQ  
(s.e.) 
ΔC  
(s.e.) 
pc = 180 –11,138 
(1,576) 
–23.0 
(0.99) 
–4.25 
(1.81) 
32,784 
(1,498) 
pc = 190 –8,404 
(1,945) 
–22.3 
(1.00) 
–4.95 
(2.09) 
29,128 
(1,718) 
pc = 200 –6,560 
(1,545) 
–21.8 
(0.98) 
–7.05 
(1.81) 
26,099 
(1,374) 
pc = 210 –5,160 
(1,473) 
–20.9 
(0.96) 
–6.05 
(2.15) 
24,176 
(1,066) 
pc = 220 –4,060 
(1,493) 
–20.1 
(0.99) 
–7.25 
(2.15) 
21,893 
(1,248) 
pc = 230 –1,408 
(1,131) 
–18.3 
(1.00) 
–11.2 
(1.82) 
16,174 
(940) 
pc = 240 –389 
(1,413) 
–16.7 
(1.00) 
–14.1 
(3.25) 
12,683 
(688) 
pc = 250 1,522 
(1,176) 
–14.6 
(0.97) 
–13.3 
(2.52) 
8,916 
(583) 
pc = 260 2,550 
(1,001) 
–10.9 
(1.10) 
–12.2 
(1.81) 
4,575 
(646) 
pc = 270 –114 
(1,029) 
–7.9 
(1.09) 
–21.5 
(2.68) 
1,347 
(539) 
pc = 280 –3,606 
(1,258) 
–3.8 
(1.08) 
–28.5 
(3.02) 
–1,387 
(546) 
pc = 290 –8,093 
(1,375) 
–0.62 
(1.50) 
–38.5 
(2.56) 
–3,214 
(670) 
pc = 300 –9,237 
(1,626) 
–0.52 
(1.39) 
–42.3 
(3.83) 
–3,338 
(696) 
 
In both scenarios, the market situation under the maximum price that generates the 
highest total welfare under monopoly is characterized by a lower number of trains compared to 
the duopoly market. This increases total welfare because the total fixed costs are lower 
compared to the competitive situation. On the other hand, it leads to higher waiting costs and 
lower number of customers in the market. 
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5. Conclusion 
The goal of the paper is to compare welfare outcomes under regulated monopoly and 
duopoly. In the model, operators adjust their prices and timetables in order to maximize profits. 
The findings therefore apply especially to unsubsidized markets and long-distance services, 
where net-cost contracts are preferred and the timetabling might be done by the operator. Using 
the model, the paper generates data for two different parameter combinations. The data suggest 
that for most levels of the maximum price, including the price of unregulated monopoly, total 
welfare under regulated monopoly will be significantly lower compared to the welfare under 
duopoly. At the same time, the data suggest that for a relatively narrow range of maximum 
prices, total welfare under monopoly may be comparable, or even higher than the welfare under 
competition. In this range of maximum prices, the number of train connections and the number 
of passengers using the monopolistic railway service is lower compared to the duopolistic 
market. Therefore, the paper suggests open-access policy might be preferable to competitive 
franchising with price regulation thanks to the effect of competition on the frequency of service, 
especially if the policy objective is not only to maximize welfare but also to increase the market 
share of railway passenger transport. 
There are many opportunities for further research in this area. In order to get more 
reliable results, it would be useful to run simulations for more sets of parameter values. 
Furthermore, it would be beneficial to test the sensitivity of the results to changes in model 
assumptions. Most importantly, it would be interesting to test whether the findings of the model 
hold if the timetable is found using an entry algorithm instead of the exit algorithm used here. 
Furthermore, the paper presents only one of many possible application of the model. Most 
importantly, the model can be used for testing different types of monopoly regulations, or for 
evaluating specific franchise contracts. 
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